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y Boston University, 270 Baystate Road, Boston, MA, 02215, US Mail: naoaki@bu.edu Web: http://people.bu.edu/naoaki/ Should we protect competition with competition law? Historically, government authorities have engaged in fostering competition in industries with antitrust laws. They have banned abusive conduct, such as tying or predatory pricing, and have prevented large mergers and acquisitions. However, in recent developments of globalization, technological progress, and the de facto standard economy, we can observe oligopolistic structures in some markets. 1 The authorities are deregulating or reinterpreting competition law and regulations to keep up with the current society's needs.
Telecommunications is one of the industries where competition is highly protected by regulations. Governments around the world adopt a regulation called a Local-Loop
Unbundling (LLU) to accelerate competition. The law requires that telephone companies that have monopolistic local premises (called "local loops") should share their lines with other companies at a low price. This is because the telecommunications industry is characterized by a "natural monopoly" due to its huge, sunk, up-front and …xed costs, and there is no competition in the market without the regulation. If governments regulate carriers with facilities to allow other …rms to use their premises, then …rms with no facilities can easily enter the market, and consumers can obtain a wide variety of high quality services at a low cost as a result of the competition. Industries that have natural monopoly characteristics, such as electric, gas, and railroad industries, also have similar unbundling regulations.
Policy makers in telecommunications, however, are confronted with a new problem in the di¤usion process of building …ber-optic networks, called FTTH (…ber to the home).
The unbundling regulation decreases the incentive for …rms to invest in the latest technology; few …rms build home …ber-optic networks. This is because they cannot get monopolistic pro…ts if they have to lend the …ber lines at a regulated low cost. Compared to the traditional metal line, this …ber-optic line can transfer large amounts of data with faster transfer rates, enabling services such as high speed internet, high qual- 1 For example: airlines, OS software, digital music downloads, credit cards, search engines, etc.
ity digital voice, HDTV programs and cloud computing. Therefore, the regulation of …ber-optic networks is one of the most important concerns of policymakers in the world today. A change in unbundling regulation would have immense e¤ects on investments, penetration of …ber-optic networks, consumer welfare, and, ultimately, a country's productivity. For example, in 2003, the United States'Federal Communication Commission (FCC) amended the law and removed unbundling regulations on …ber-optic premises in order to accelerate building competition among carriers and promote investments in …ber networks, even though many companies without facilities objected. 2 However, in relation to unbundling regulation's importance, the literature that studies it is limited. This is because the municipal level data set is rarely available and building of the new networks, such as …ber-optic networks, is uncommon. For example, in the telecommunication industry, metal networks were built more than 50 years ago; the new networks that are going to be formed will be the …rst since the 1960s. Tables 1 and 2 show the international comparisons for the di¤usion and regulation of …ber networks. We can observe that Japan is one of the rare countries that experienced penetration and continued unbundling regulation.
Previous literature mainly studies the e¤ects of unbundling on service markets. Greenstein and Mazzeo (2006) found that unbundling widened the variety of services, and
Economides, Seim and Viard (2008) found that competition in service markets induced 2 This deregulation has been continually criticized by …rms that use the regulated lines, and created a controversy between regulated …rms and the users of their facilities. For example, in December 2009, Cbeyond.Inc, supported by the Small Business Administration (SBA), …led a petition with the FCC to reverse the deregulation. In response to this, the Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA) and the Fiber-to-the-Home (FTTH) Council in January 2010 jointly …led with the FCC not to reverse the deregulation. Similar disputes exists in Asia and Europe. For example, the Japanese government is considering joint managment of …ber-optic networks within all related …rms. In Australia, the largest telecom company, Tlesta, declared that they will not build …ber networks if the regulation is enforced.
by unbundling increased social welfare. However, the e¤ects of unbundling on infrastructure construction markets is not considered well. To reveal the e¤ects on infrastructure construction of unbundling, the Japanese experience was an important episode. In 2005-2009, Japanese government continued the unbundling regulation on new …ber-optic lines in the di¤usion periods of …ber-optic network construction. In the process, cable television and electric companies have reduced or stopped building their …ber lines. They claimed to regulators that the unbundling decreased their incentives to build their own lines. This is due to their lost of potential customers to the unbundling user …rms, and also to intense price competition with unbundled …rms. As a result, in Japan, regulated …rms have dominated the infrastructure markets with the increase of unbundling usage, and regulators failed to accelerate competition in building …ber-optic networks.
Using this phenomenon and the data sets, this paper analyzes unbundling regulation e¤ects on the entry decision of new …rms in building networks, and gauges the regulation's e¤ects on competition in the building of infrastructure. In this paper, we show the e¤ects of unbundling usage on cable television's entry decision on the …ber network construction using linear regression and probit estimation. Second, this paper models the dynamic game of infrastructure construction and estimates the e¤ect of unbundling on the pro…ts of new entrants. To evaluate how unbundling a¤ects the infrastructure construction, we need a dynamic model of entry. New …rms enter the market considering future pro…ts because it takes a huge initial investment to build the …ber lines. In both cases, we …nd the negative e¤ects of unbundling on entry decisions due to pro…t decrease. This …nding suggests that unbundling regulation during periods of new technology di¤usion decreases competition in the infrastructure market. This paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 overviews related literature. Section 2 discusses unbundling regulation and what happened in the infrastructure competition in the …ber penetration in Japan. The data sets to be used in this study, their management and their characteristics are presented in Section 3. In Section 4, the evidence from linear and probit estimation is provided. The model of dynamic game of infrastructure competition and the estimation identi…cation is discussed in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes. First, we identify that unbundling regulations prevent new entry in the facility market.
Previous Related Literature
Previous literature mainly focuses on the service markets. This paper gauges the e¤ects of how unbundling regulation to foster competition in service markets changed the competition in di¤erent markets. We …nd that regulation increases the regulated …rms'share paradoxically, even though it aims to weaken those …rms. Secondly, we use the events of installing new technology to identify the e¤ects. The installment of …ber-optic lines to the home is a good case to check the regulation e¤ects: entrants constructing new …ber lines needs a signi…cant amount of money, and we can observe those behaviors clearly.
Furthermore, policy makers are currently debating whether to keep the regulation on …ber premises or not. In Japan's case, "free and fair" competition in service markets, induced by unbundling, destructs facility competition. Third, because entry decision in telecommunications is based heavily on dynamic behaviors, this pape r estimates the e¤ects using structural dynamic models. In 1998, unbundling regulation was exported outside the United States. Under the WTO telecommunications law, unbundling is approved as accelerating free and fair competition in telecommunications. Similar regulations are imposed in more than 80 countries over the world.
In the U.S., however, regulated …rms brought many suits on the regulations. They claimed that it decreased the investments of regulated …rms, weakened facility-based competition, and infringed upon their property rights. In response to these claims and judicial decisions, the FCC amended some of the regulations. Particularly, the FCC confronted the delay of prevalence of …ber to the home (FTTH) and aimed to speed up the di¤usion. In contrast, regulated carriers insisted that unbundling regulation deterred their investments on building …ber-optic networks. To encourage the di¤usion of …ber-optic networks, the FCC in 2003 decided to remove unbundling regulation on …ber lines.
Whether this decision by the FCC was good for social bene…ts is still under discussion. In the contrast to era of Telecommunication Act of 1996, when regulated …rms complained, at present the user …rms of unbundling regulation are petitioning to the FCC to reverse the deregulation on unbundling on …ber lines.
Di¤usion of Fiber-Optic Networks and Battles over Unbundling in Japan
Unlike the United States, Japan is among the countries that faithfully adheres to the unbundling regulation of the WTO agreement on both …ber and metal lines. In Japan, Finally, by the end of the 2000s, NTT's share of …ber lines was around 75%, and they dominated the …ber facility market, eliminating other …rms under unbundling regulation.
Also, a few CATV started to borrow the …ber lines from NTT, rather than build lines themselves. 3 This market structure was heavily criticized by both user …rms and facility competitors faced with a monopolistic situation. The MIC is currently discussing to deprive the operation of …ber lines from NTT. However, NTT and their stockholders are heavily opposed to the idea because they have already used 2.7 trillion yen to install …ber lines, and the infrastructure is one of the important sources of pro…ts for NTT.
This paper assesses numerically whether unbundling regulation prevents new entries in the facility market and whether it induces monopolization.
Data Description and Variables Construction 3.1 Data Sources
This paper uses four data sets and matches them in a municipal level for analysis. The …rst data is unbundling regulation usage data. NTT East, a unique, regulated carrier in eastern Japan, provides data of the number of companies that used NTT's …ber-optic facility in station level between 2005 to 2009. The number of stations that NTT modi…ed to the …ber lines is also taken from this data.
The second source is the entry and exit data of …ber-optic network (FTTH) building markets. The Ministry of Internal A¤airs and Communications (MIC), a Japanese regulation authority, provides an information and communications statistics database.
Using these …gures, we can detect which company built the …ber-optic premises between a station and a home in an prefecture of monthly interval. Therefore, we can identify when, where, and which …rms built the …ber-optic networks (FTTH).
The third data are …gures that examine CATVs and their coverage area. The Regional Broadcasting Division in the MIC provides facility data of CATVs in a municipal level.
Using this data set, we can identify which CATVs enter which market. Combined with the second FTTH data set, we can deduce which CATVs built …ber-optic networks (FTTH) in which markets. Most …rms that build …ber-optic networks provide HDTV programs via …ber line, so the data includes …rms such as TEPCO (operated by The Tokyo Electric
Power Company) and JCN (operated by KDDI), which do not specialize in CATV.
The fourth source is market characteristics data. We use population, population density, and income at a market level. The population and density data is taken from the 2005 Census, and income data is taken from a tax division of the MIC.
Construction of Variables 3.2.1 De…nition of Market
This paper combines the aforementioned four data sets in a municipal level. The municipal is the smallest de…nition of a market that we can construct using public data. minimum is 131) 5 The reason we use the municipal level data is twofold: First, in our model of dynamic entry game, we assume symmetric …rms. If we use a larger de…nition than a municipal level, it is possible that the assumption of a symmetric …rm size is false.
For example, if we use a larger de…nition of a market, it is possible that 10-20 CATVs enter in one market, but their actual sizes might be very di¤erent. If we divide large …rms with small areas, we can assume similar symmetric size in the area. Most markets contain zero to two CATVs. Second, this paper considers competing networks between CATV …rms. In other words, we assume consumers can choose …ber-optic lines from a few options, such as one NTT and one or two CATVs. If we use a larger data size, the consumers' choice set is di¤erent from an actual one. Using the municipal market de…nition, in more than 95% of market, the consumer has to choose between two CATVs or less, and this is plausible, considering the actual consumers'choice set.
Usage of Unbundling Regulation
One of the key variables in this paper is the usage of unbundling regulation. NTT East advertises the number of …rms that used their …ber facilities. Because we cannot get the direct quantity data in each market, we used this number as a measure of unbundling regulation usage. We take two variables from this data set: usage of "station to home" and usage of "station to station" …ber-optic network. The "station to home" usage is our most concern, which is the usage of …ber optic networks (FTTH) between the core network to the home/o¢ ce. In each market there are several stations (average is 3.67).
The maximum number of usage …rms for the station in the market are taken as the market's usage measure, assuming several …rms enters in all markets. We guess there is a positive correlation between the usage and the number of families: in a large market, the number of …rms which uses the NTT's facility will increase. To account for this, we divide the number of …rms by the number of families. Therefore, in this paper, the number of usage …rms per household is the measure of the market's usage level of unbundling regulation in the market.
The regulation system of unbundling itself is the same all over eastern Japan: NTT has to lend all their facilities to every applicant at the same rental price determined by the regulation authority. However, the usage level is di¤erent in each market. There are several sources that contribute to this variety. First, the regulation price is …xed in all markets; however, the actual rental price could be di¤erent in each market. In general, the price in a urban area is higher than a rural area, so the real rental price is relatively lower in the urban area. Furthermore, the cost to build a …ber-optic network is also di¤erent in each market. It costs a lot to build a …ber-optic network in some rural areas that have low population densities or are isolated by mountains or seas. Even in some urban locales, if the telephone/CATV lines are underground, the cost of building a …ber-network is higher compared to installation via telephone poles. Therefore, in low real rental price markets, …rms easily use NTT's premises and the number of usage …rms will increase. So, the usage level is di¤erent due to actual price. Second, the usage demand of consumers are di¤erent in each areas. In general, NTT's facilities are provided to all companies, whereas non-NTT facilities are self-used. If a city has popular community-based TV programs or ISPs, then those …rms may increase NTT's usage. Third, the procedures and connection condition is also di¤erent in each market. In a discussion between NTT and user …rms, an argument ensued about problems such as how promptly NTT should react to user …rms'applications. These factors may also a¤ect the usage-level variety.
Building Fiber-Optic Networks
In this paper, the main interest is to analyze if CATVs built their own …ber networks between station to home (FTTH). The …ber network backbone had been installed all over Japan more than ten years ago. However, with metal lines, the data transfer rate decreases exponentially with the from the core network. Comparably, with …ber-optic lines from core network to the home/o¢ ce, the transfer rate reduction disappears and a high data transfer rate is maintained. The line between a station to a home is called the "last one mile," (the distance a station can cover is approximately one mile.) In the process of building …ber-optic networks, installing this "last one mile" makes up a large part of cost. Therefore, this installment is of much interest to policy makers. 
Market Characteristics
Because the decision of building the …ber-optic network also depends on market factors, we used several market characteristics variables. We took two categories: demand and cost. As demand factors, number of households, number of people per household, and average income are taken. We also used population density as cost factors of the market. The density is population divided by area in each market. It costs more to install lowerdensity markets. All market variables are …xed in one year, because it is di¢ cult to get the data with time and also do not change much from year to year. In the estimation of dynamic game, we can reduce the state space by …xing unchangeable variables. We took from the 2005 Japanese census the number of households, number of people per household, density, and average income of the market. The income is taken from the tax division in the MIC of 2008. To adjust the unit problem, we divide all market characteristics by the mean of the variable. Assuming the e¤ects of these market characteristics are concave, we take a log of all variables, after adding 1 to avoid an in…nity problem.
Evidences and Identi…cation

Linear Regression Models
First, this paper considers whether the usage of unbundling a¤ects the entry share of CATVs into the …ber optic networks market, using linear regression models. We assume the following estimation equation
where y mt is the percentage of CATV …rms that build the …ber-optic lines (the number of CATVs, that build …ber-optic networks divided by the number of all CATVs), usage mt is the number of …rms per household that used the NTT's regulated facility between station to home, which is our interest. 6 station mt is the number of the stations which NTT adopted the …ber-optic lines. We use this variable as the measurement of quantity of NTT's line. This variable is for distinguishing the usage e¤ect from NTT's competitor e¤ects. X mt is market characteristic variables: number of households, number of people per household, average income and density. d m and d t are the market and year dummy.
Considering the endogeneity of usage mt , we used the number of …rms which used the regulated facility between station to station as the instrument. When …rms with no 6 We divided by number of households, because oftenly when number of households increase, number of user …rms increase. However, there are possibility the divsion of family caused the negative e¤etct, because the number of user …rms increase concavely. We consider the e¤ects and checked robustness using original …rms number and exponental conversion. We con…rmed the signi…cant negative e¤ects. facility typically enter into the market, they use both station to home facility and station to station facility. Some …rms use just station to home lines; these are called bottleneck facility, because some of them have station to station facility. Therefore, the usage of station to station facility is related to the usage of station to home facility. However, the decision of CATV …rms as to whether they build the line between station and home should be unrelated to the usage of the facility between station and station, because the station to station usage will not substitute the lines between home and station. We use this as instrument variable and estimated the estimation equation. Table 8 depicts the results of linear regression model. This table reports whether the unbundling usage of NTT facility decreases the entry share of CATVs in building …ber-optic networks. The …rst column is ordinary random-e¤ects GLS regression. The usage has no signi…cant results. CATVs will enter in the earlier stage considering the future pro…ts, rather than later stage. The second column estimates allowing the endogeneity of usage, using 2SLS random-e¤ects IV regression. NTT's competitor e¤ects become signi…cant, but we cannot observe signi…cant usage e¤ect. The third column shows the results of random-e¤ects tobit regression. In this regression, we consider the censored data e¤ects. The entry share (…ber CATVs divided by all CATVs) should takes between 0 and 1 from its de…nition. Considering these e¤ects, we used a tobit model. This estimation does not consider the endogeneity because of limitation of tobit regression. The tobit regression's result shows the usage is signi…cantly negative. Therefore, we observed the usage of NTT facility decreases the CATV's entry share in building …ber-networks.
Probit Models
Next, using the discrete choice model, we consider how much the usage of unbundling a¤ects the number of entry of CATVs to …ber-optic networks. We consider entry decisions using probit and bivariate order probit models. First, we assume following estimation equations with an IV probit model and consider the causality of usage on building …ber-optic networks.
where y mt takes 1 if there is entry in the …ber-optic building market, otherwise 0.
Other variables are almost all the same and I used the same instruments with the linear regression model. Also, I added the number of current incumbents of the market that built the …ber-optic lines (Incumbent mt ), and could not enter the market dummy compared to linear regression model because we used the instrument in the probit model. Next, we con…rm the e¤ect of usage using a bivariate ordered probit model. The bivariate ordered probit model also can solve the endogeneity problem. We assumed the following estimation equations:
where y mt is the entry of CATV …rms that build their own optical …ber network.
\ usage mt is the number of …rms that used NTT's facility. This is similar to previous usage mt but we discretise it in 7 bins to estimate by ordered probit model. Instrument mt is the same with a linear regression model. Other variables are the same de…nition.
Our previous concern was the endogeneity between y mt and \ usage mt , and the correlation between " mt and mt causes the bias. In this model, we simultaneously estimated the two probit/ordered probit models using a bivariate ordered probit model, allowing the correlation between " mt and mt , and solving the problem. Table 9 denotes the results of probit models. We could not add the market e¤ects for IV or ordered probit model's estimation limitation. The …rst column estimates the e¤ects of the usage on whether CATVs enter in …ber-networks or not, using IV probit model. We observed that the usage decreased the entry signi…cantly. The second and third columns are the results of bivariate ordered probit model. By simultaneously estimating the ordered probit model, we get the true e¤ect of removing the bias caused by endogeneity.
The results also suggest that the regulation usage decreased the number of CATVs that build …ber-optic networks.
Unbundling E¤ects on the Dynamic Behaviors of New Entrants
Structural Dynamic Entry Game Model
In comparison to the above, in this section we consider a structural dynamic entry game.
By modeling the competition in building …ber-optic networks using dynamic game, we get several good features. First, in the model of dynamic game, we can estimate dynamic behavior of …rms. The telecommunication industry has natural monopolistic characteristics for its huge, sunk, up-front and …xed costs. The entrants consider future pro…ts and make the decision to build the …ber-network facility over the long term. In the dynamic model, we can model this aspect, compared to static models. Second, by this dynamic structural estimation, we can estimate unknown parameters that ordinary estimation methods cannot get. We have only entry and exit data of …ber-optic network, usage of unbundling regulation, and market characteristics in market level. Using that data, we con…rmed the e¤ects of regulation on the entry share and the number of entries in previous models. However, by adding a bit of economic assumptions, we can estimate the pro…t function and sunk cost of entry. These estimates have important values for designing regulation and considering the social impact of the regulation on …ber-optic diffusion and competition. Furthermore, we can value the policy change by counter-factual simulation using the getting parameters. 8 
Framework
There are m 2 f1; 2; 3; :::; M g independent geographic markets and t 2 f1; 2; 3; :::; 1g CATVs decide whether to build …ber-optic station to home lines to their clients or not, while NTT decides whether build station to home …ber-optic lines in its stations or not.
Because the exit from o¤ering …ber-optic network is very rare, we limit the …rms'option as whether they enter or not. (We deleted the markets where a …rm quit o¤ering a …ber-optic network.)
The timing of the game is as follows. First, at the beginning of each time period t, NTT and CATVs observe: 1.) the number of CATVs that have already constructed …ber-optic networks; 2.) the number of stations for which NTT has already adopted a 8 In the future revision, we are planning to conduct this.
optical …ber network; 3.) usage of NTT's facility by user …rms; 4.) market characteristics;
5.) market …xed e¤ect and 6.) current year. Second, CATVs decide whether they build the …ber-optic network in the market and NTT decides whether they build its …ber-optic network in additional stations, simultaneously. Third, entrant CATVs pay costs, and NTT also pays a cost if they decide to increase lines (stations) for …ber-networks. At the end of each period, incumbent CATVs get pro…ts and NTT also gets proportional to its station. After the realization, market states evolve to next period. We should keep in mind that this model assumes a one year "time-to-build": the entrants pay the building cost at time t, but they will earn pro…ts after t + 1.
State and Action Variables
Considering the competition of building …ber-optic networks and applying it to the model, we de…ne here …ve state variables. Observing these state variables, CATVs and NTT decide to build …ber-optic networks. The …ve state variables are the number of …ber-built CATVs, the number of …ber-built NTT stations, usage of NTT facility, market dummy and year dummy. We …xed the other market characteristic variables such as number of households, density and income, because they will not change much over time and we can decrease the state space. In this paper, we assumed the number of …ber-built CATVs and the number of …ber-built NTT stations as endogenous state variables for which the model determines the state. We also assumed usage of NTT facility, market dummy and year dummy as exogenous state variables, for these states variables evolve outside the model. We discretise the variables to reduce the state space: number of NTT's …ber-built stations for 4 bins, usage for 7 bins. The state of number of …ber-built CATVs are 3.
(0, 1 and 2) I also constructed 4 market dummy and 4 year dummy. Therefore the total state space is 3 4 7 4 4 = 1344.
We assume action variables are binary. For CATVs, it is whether they build station to home …ber-optic networks for their clients. For NTT, it is whether they increase station to home …ber-optic stations. In the most markets, CATVs did not exit …ber-optic network service and NTT did not decrease the …ber-station. We can assume CATVs do not exit and NTT does not disinvest. We deleted markets in which CATV exited or NTT disinvested.
Unobservable Heterogeneity
One NTT's …ber station for each market. By regressing them of market characteristics, we get residuals of each market. We discretised the residual for four bins, and get three dummies to adjust the level of unobserved pro…tability. In the second stage, we added the three dummies to the per period payo¤ function to remove the unobserved heterogeneous bias.
Spurious Relationship
In the di¤usion process, key variables such as usage of unbundling, NTT's …ber station and entry of CATVs increased simultaneously. We may have another concerns on the spurious relationship. To remove this e¤ects, I added year e¤ects in pro…t function as endogenous variables. It increases with year and stops in 2009. We can evaluate the usage e¤ects avoiding year e¤ects by this.
Per Period Payo¤ Function
We assumed linear and reduced-form payo¤ function. Linear forms require less computing time and these assumptions are also common in other papers.
where X mt is demand factors of the market (number of …rms, number of people per household and average income), Z mt is cost factors of the market (density), g(N imt ; N imt )
is the competitors'e¤ect of similar services (number of other CATVs that provide …ber-optic services and number of …ber stations of NTT), and G mt is the unbundling regulation e¤ects. We took facility usage of NTT …rms. We used number of …rms which used NTT's facility as measurement. In this paper, we assume CATVs are symmetric and the size of NTT's stations are also identical. These …rms conduct Cournot type competition, and the regulation access rates' e¤ects has already re ‡ected the usage of unbundling regulation. We assumed …rms pay sunk cost to enter, and get zero pro…t if they do not enter.
On the competitor e¤ect g(N imt ; N imt ); we didn't assume the proportional e¤ects because the …rst competitor's e¤ect is larger than the second competitor's in CATVs competition. We also assume the CATV's entry a¤ects NTT's decision, and NTT's construction a¤ects CATV's decision. Re ‡ecting these, the function of g(N imt ; N imt ) becomes the following:
presence of second CATV that constructed FTTH
# of NTT's …ber stations
Firms Behaviors and Markov Perfect Equilibrium
Under the above assumptions, CATVs and NTT simultaneously chooses their actions to maximize the present values of the sums of future pro…ts. We can de…ne value function as follows,
where a it is an action variable of …rm i, type and time t. S it is the state variable for …rm i and time t. Following previous literature, we take the discount factor as 0.95 because the data is annual. A Markov strategy is a mapping i (S it ) 7 ! f0; 1g 2 A it , where A i is the …rm's action set. If CATV …rms enter in or NTT increased the …ber station, it is 1; otherwise, 0.
We can rewrite the above value function, conditional on the strategy,
Then a set of Markov strategy ( ) is a Markov Perfect Equilibrium if and only if, for all i, S it , and alternative strategy 0 it ; satis…es
Exogenous Transition Probability
Endogenous state variables, number of …ber-built CATVs, and number of …ber-built NTT stations, evolve within the model and their transition probabilities are determined by rational pro…t maximizing behavior of CATVs and NTT. Compared with these, usage of NTT facility's transition probabilities, market dummy and year e¤ect are determined exogenously.
First, we construct the transition probability matrix of usage of NTT …ber lines from actual movement. Each element of transition probability is calculated from the following equations using actual observations. These calculations are similar to Dunne, Klimek,
Roberts and Xu (2009) or Elejalde (2009).
[ Prob(usage 0 jusage) = P (m;t) 1(usage m;t+1 = usage 0 and usage m;t = usage) P (m;t) 1(usage m;t = usage)
In this dynamic game settings, we assume that CATVs and NTT perfectly predict the future usage of NTT facility and decides their entry decisions.
Second, we assumed market dummy is …xed over the year, and it does not change.
Also, year e¤ects increase with time, but stop in 4 years after. These transition is common knowledge for players.
Estimation Methodology
In this paper, we used Aguirregabria and Mira ( The value function is de…ned as
From action observable, we can construct CCP(conditional choice probabilities),
I(.) is the indicator function, and we assume t N (0; ):
Nested Pseudo Likelihood estimator is calculated using the following procedures.
Step 1: Set initial probability. We took nonparametrically the initial CCP from the data set, following AM(2007), as
Step 2: Given a CPP(P k ), construct the pseudo maximum likelihood function and get the k+1 by maximization
where is the choice probability function.
Step 3: Based on P k and the k+1 in the step 2, update the probability function according to
for all a j 2 A and x 2 X:
Step 4: Continuously updates Step 2 and Step 3 till 's distance converges. We took the criterion to 1e-3.
These are direct application of AM(2007). For further analysis, we can improve or expand the results. We divided the market dummies by four, due to the state space problem, but more smooth adjustment will improve the estimates like sunk cost of NTT and market characteristics, which are the di¤erent sign with our prediction. Also, using this values, we can evaluate counter-factual analysis on policy issues:how many CATVs build their own …ber lines if regulators quit unbundling like FCC in the US.
Implication
Conclusion
This paper studies the e¤ects of competition law on other related markets that are not targeted by the law. One of important analyses on unbundling regulation is the e¤ects on compentition structure in infrastructure markets, which previous literature have not studied well. This paper identi…ed the e¤ects using unique events of …ber-lines infrastructure formation, and estimated how the unbundling regulation usage changed the CATVs'entry behaviors. Japanese data set is utilized because it has experienced …ber lines penetration and continued unbundling regulation, in contrast with other countries.
This study …nds that the unbundling regulational usage block new entry and has monopolization e¤ects for regulated carriers on building …ber-optic networks. Using the entry data of CATV …rms in building …ber-optic networks and the usage data of regulated …ber-optic facilities, this paper structurally estimates the pro…t function and the entry sunk cost, assuming dynamic entry game. Estimation results suggest that the regulation reduces the pro…t of new entrants, and prevents to build their own …ber-optic networks.
Quitting to build their own lines is fatal decision for CATVs because they may go extinct in the near future if they cannot o¤er high speed internet or HD TV programs via …ber lines. 9 As a policy implication, this paper suggests that there is a possibility that competition law distorts market discipline and reduce the competition in related markets. New …rms enter markets seeking monopolistic pro…ts. If regulations remove the monopolistic gains, …rms will not enter the markets. As an example, unbundling regulation is the double- 0  542  912  591  858  578  852  572  792  542  772  1  300  50  272  94  276  99  283  147  299  164  2  94  0  75  10  85  11  84  21  95  24  3  21  0  18  0  17  0  17  2  19  2  4  4 is the share of CATV …rms that build …ber-optic networks *1: usage is the number of …rms per household that use the regulated facility between home and station *2: In the IV estimation, this paper uses the number of …rms that use the regulated facility between station and station as the instrument of usage *3: In the Tobit estimation, the upper and lower bounds are 0 and 1, each. * is signi…cant at 10% , ** is at 5% and *** is at 1%. Parenthis is standard deviation. Note: * In the IV estimation, this paper uses the number of …rms that use the regulated facility between station and station as the instrument of usage * is signi…cant at 10% , ** is at 5% and *** is at 1%. Parenthis is standard deviation. 
